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NETWORK INTERFACE DESIGN FOR NETWORK ON CHIP 
by 
Jiawei Zhong 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2014 
In the culture of globalized integrated circuit (IC, a.k.a chip) production, the use 
of Intellectual Property (IP) cores, computer aided design tools (CAD) and testing 
services from un-trusted vendors are prevalent to reduce the time to market. 
Unfortunately, the globalized business model potentially creates opportunities for 
hardware tampering and modification from adversary, and this tampering is known as 
hardware Trojan (HT). Network-on-chip (NoC) has emerged as an efficient on-chip 
communication infrastructure. In this work, the security aspects of NoC network 
interface (NI), one of the most critical components in NoC is investigated and 
presented. Particularly, the NI design, hardware attack models and countermeasures 
for NI in a NoC system are explored. 
An Open Core Protocol compatible NI is implemented in an IBM0.18μm CMOS 
technology. The synthesis results are presented and compared with existing literature. 
Second, comprehensive hardware attack models targeted for NI are presented from 
system level to circuit level. The impact of hardware Trojans on NoC functionality 
and performance are evaluated. Finally, a countermeasure method is proposed to 
address the hardware attacks in NIs.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of On-Chip Communication Infrastructure 
Current rapid improvement of VLSI technology is yielding a more powerful, 
capable and flexible system on a single silicon die. The embedded and computing 
system design nowadays has moved from single core to the era of multi-core and 
eventually to many core architectures [1]. The integration of numerous intellectual 
property (IP) blocks on a chip has become a feasible and popular design methodology, 
which is known as system-on-chip (SoC). One SoC example is shown in Figure 
1-1.These heterogeneous IPs can be micro-processor, data memory, multimedia 
decoder and general peripherals. They mainly communicate with each other via an 
on-chip bus. Several industrial bus standards are available for SoCs, such as ARM 
AXI [2], IBM CoreConnect [3] and Wishbone [4]. 
 
Figure 1-1 SoC: Bus-centric communication architecture 
The traditional bus centric communication in multi-core SoC (MPSoC) has 
several drawbacks, including limited bandwidth efficiency, high latency, poor 
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flexibility and extensive overhead in terms of power and area [5]. Those limitations 
become more severe as the chip complexity and the number of IP cores increase. An 
emerging on-chip interconnect solution, known as network-on-chip (NoC), has been 
widely investigated by industry and academia communities [6-9]. The design of NoC 
and its interface to SoC are pivotal in addressing all the issues mentioned above. As a 
result, NoC is recognized as the mainstream communication architecture for MPSoCs. 
In NoC-based MPSoCs, multiple processing IP cores are connected within a network 
of routers and network interfaces (NIs), rather than the regular buses. Figure 1-2 
shows a generic NoC system typically consists of routers, links and network 
interfaces (NIs). Routers are the places where the data is directed to different paths, 
links are wires connecting two routers and the NIs are the units implementing the 
protocol and sockets between routers and IPs [6].  
 
Figure 1-2 Topological illustration of Network-on-Chip (NoC) 
 NoC has superior advantages such as scalability, reusability and high 
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performance over traditional buses. However, this new infrastructure also brings in 
new weaknesses to the MPSoC system [7]. In most of the previous literature, the 
research on NoC mainly focuses on system topology, functionality implementation, 
routing & switching techniques, traffic characterization, computer-aided design (CAD) 
tools and libraries design [10-13], but security and reliability aspects in such system 
have not been fully explored. Therefore, in this thesis, we address the hardware 
security issues in NoC design, and particularly in the network interface. 
1.2 Motivations for Trustworthy IC 
Hardware security in IC is emerging as an important research topic in recent years. 
Modern IC design and manufacturing often involve purchased IP cores from 
third-party vendors, electronic design automation (EDA) software from different 
suppliers, outsourced design, testing, assembling and packaging services. This 
globalization business model helps IC companies to reduce cost and shorten the time 
to market, but also makes fabricated ICs vulnerable to several malicious attacks 
[14-15]. Figure 1-3 shows the trust level at different steps of an IC design cycle. Each 
party associated with the design cycle can potentially compromise an IC’s 





Figure 1-3 Trust level at each level of an IC design cycle (Source: [8]) 
HTs can be introduced in any design phase of IC design, from RTL description, 
gate-level netlist, CAD tool libraries to GDSII file [16-17]. HTs can have serious 
impact on the IC while in operation, especially in security sensitive applications such 
as military, communication and national infrastructure. For instances, a malicious 
microprocessor with shadow mode was implemented in [9]; a back door insertion into 
the MicroSemi chips was reported in [10], which brought severe economic loss; and 
similar attacks are also found in military radar recently [11], which made the radar fail 
to detect enemies. As more and more transistors can be integrated into a single die, we 
may expect that hardware security aspect in communication infrastructure, such as the 
prevalent NoC, will be another concern in the near future. The consequences of HT 
attacks in NoC, particularly in NI, may be more severe than those in IP cores for the 
following reasons: 
 NoC is a complex network composed of a large number of heterogeneous IP cores. 
In modern IC business, some of these IP cores may be possibly purchased from 
third-party vendors. It is difficult to ensure that all of the IPs is trustworthy, thus 
increasing the risk of hardware Trojan insertion [21-22]. 
 Although the IP cores on-chip are heterogeneous, the NoC infrastructure itself is 
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highly modular. The routers and NIs in a NoC can be identical in a network 
[23-24]. If hardware Trojan is inserted into the NoC standard module or library, 
the HT attacks can be easily manifested through the entire network. 
 The NIs in NoC are not only connecting wires between IP cores and routers. The 
functionalities of state-of-art NIs include packet encapsulation and de-capsulation, 
routing computation, quality-of-service (QoS) and flow control [12]. As the NIs 
becomes more powerful and complicated, more attack locations and opportunities 
are available to adversary, and the consequences of HTs are more difficult to 
predict than before as well. 
Most of the previous works related to hardware trustworthy and security are 
mainly focused on the functional IP cores, such as general-purpose processor [9], 
cryptographic IP, memory block and peripheral interface [62]. Although simple 
examples for the attacks in NoCs have been provided in previous studies [11, 26-29], 
those examples are not sufficient and complete for NoC designers to create 
meaningful attack models at physical level to evaluate the security performance for a 
given NoC design. 
1.3 Related Work &Our Contributions 
Security aspects in NoCs were first discussed in [11,26]. Security attacks on 
integrated circuits and their application systems are generally classified into software 
attacks, physical attacks and side-channel attacks. Such classification also applies to 
NoCs. Security attacks in NoCs cause denial of service, extract secret information, or 
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alter execution or configuration of a system to conduct additional duties for 
adversaries (a.k.a hijacking) [13]. 
Diguet et al. proposed a first solution for configurable NoC based communication 
system in [14]. Diguet’s security framework is composed of secure network interface 
and secure configuration manager, not including NoC routers. To implement a secure 
NoC, Fiorin et al. [15] highlighted the need of address protection unit in network 
interface and weighted round robin arbiter in router, as well as security automata to 
monitor unexpected routines. Recently, Fiorin et al. presented data protection unit 
designs in details to address the secure memory access in NoC [30-31]. To tackle 
power, electromagnetic and network snooping attacks on NoCs, Gebotys and Zhang 
made an effort on the transport and application layers by securing the cryptographic 
key exchange mechanism in NoC [16-17]. Sajeesh and Kapoor also exploited 
authenticated encryption in network interface to secure communication among IP 
cores [18]. LeMay and Gunter introduced a NoC Firewall implemented in a special 
functional hardware description language to facilitate formal analysis and thus 
detected attacks that violate NoC protocol [19]. As cryptography units are 
hardware-consuming, not all NoC-based systems can afford using crypto units at 
transport and application layers of NoCs. To broaden the choice of methods for NoC 
security enhancement, security attacks on other NoC layers need to be investigated, as 
well. Some tangible examples of security attacks are provided in existing literatures 
[13, 20]; however, the attack models for NoCs are either not thorough or too 
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high-level to be directly used in the procedure of NoC security assessment. Specific 
HT attack models that are tightly couple with typical NoC design details will benefit 
NoC designers and users to be aware of potential HT attacks and the corresponding 
HT consequence in system development stage. 
Besides, NI design and implementation are extensively explored in [23,25,34-39], 
but none of them ever addresses the hardware Trojan or security aspects in NI. In this 
work, we will fill in the gap. Our main contributions are as follows. 
 We design and implement a highly modular network interface to facilitate the 
standard OCP compatible NoC design. Hardware cost, latency performance and 
power consumption of our baseline NI are compared to existing NIs. 
 We analyze the NI from system level to gate level and propose potential HT attack 
models in terms of possible attack locations and potential low probability trigger 
signals. The attack models are justified either by analytical derivation or by 
practical simulation. 
 The impact of HT in a NoC system is quantitatively investigated and visually 
evaluated by applying the attack models to NoC applications. 
 Finally, we propose HT aware detection method for HT countermeasures 
embedded into the baseline design. The efficiency of our method is also assessed 
with quantitative results. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as below. 
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Chapter 2 briefly describes the basics of NoC, including architecture, routing 
scheme, switching technique, end-to-end flow control and advanced functionalities. 
Chapter 3 introduces the proposed NI design in details, including all the 
sub-modules. 
Chapter 4 illustrates a comprehensive hardware Trojan attack model for NI, 
including HT trigger design and payload placement. 
Chapter 5 presents implementation details of several practical HTs. The impact of 
HTs on video and image applications is also evaluated using application. A 
countermeasure method is also proposed to facilitate the HT detection. 
Chapter 6 summarizes this thesis and discusses future work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
NOC BASICS 
NoC encompasses a wide spectrum of research topics, ranging from highly 
software application related issues (e.g. network traffic characterization and routing 
scheme), across system topology (e.g. NoC topologies) to physical link level 
implementation (e.g. FPGA and ASIC).The design space of a NoC is considerably 
larger than that of a bus-based solution, as NoC can employ different routing and 
arbitration strategies can be implemented as well as different organizations of the 
communication infrastructure. This enables the SoC designer to find one of suitable 
NoC solutions for specific system characteristic and constraints. In this chapter, we 
present the main concepts involved in NoCs. Our baseline NI design was 
implemented in IBM 0.18μm technology following the digital ASIC design flow. The 
synthesis results for silicon area, power and timing are compared with existing 
literature. 
2.1 NoC Structure 
The conceptual NoC is shown in Figure 2-1.A generic Network-on-Chip system 
typically consists of network interfaces (NI), routers, physical links, and intellectual 
property (IP) cores [21]. The IP cores are also called functional blocks or processing 
elements, which are the main on-chip resources for data computation and processing. 
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IP core can be CPU, DSP processor, on chi memory, general I/O block and video 
codec. 
 
Figure 2-1 NoC: Network-based communication architecture (Source: [22]) 
2.1.1 Router 
 
Figure 2-2 Five-port NoC router architecture 
The design of router is to route the data according to chosen protocols, routing 
and switching techniques. A NoC router is composed of input ports and output ports 
connected to the shared NoC channels, a switching crossbar connecting the input 
ports to the corresponding output ports, and a local port to access the IP core at this 
router node. A generic architecture of five-port NoC router can be seen in Figure 2-2 
[41-42]. In addition to this physical connection infrastructure, the router also contains 
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a logic block that implements the flow control policies and defines the overall strategy 
for transferring data through the NoC. 
2.1.2 Links 
Links provide the raw bandwidth and physical connection with routers. It is 
composed of one or more logical or physical channels, and each channel consists of a 
set of metal wires. Typically, a NoC link has two physical channels, making a 
full-duplex connection for bi-directional transmission between the routers. The 
number of parallel wires per channel is typically uniform throughout the network and 
is known as the channel bandwidth. 
2.1.3 Network Interface (NI) 
Network Interfaces (NIs) implement the logic connection by which IP cores 
connect to the NoC. Their function is to decouple the data processing of IP core from 
the communication network, and make it feasible to reuse core and communication 
infrastructure. In [23], the author partitions the NI into two parts: a front end and a 
back end. The front end handles the core requests and is ideally unaware of the NoC. 
This part is usually implemented as interconnect socket and some of the industrial 
communication protocols are applied at the front end, such as OCP [24], AXI [2], and 
Wishbone [4]. The back end part assembles and disassembles the packet, reorders 
buffers, implements synchronization protocols, and helps the router in terms of 




Figure 2-3 Generic NI architecture 
2.2 NoC Design Problems 
To provide a complete NoC solution, we need specify many aspects and 
characteristics from bottom to up. The designers may also need to trade off among 
functionality, overhead and reliability according to the application requirements. The 
state-of-art NoCs adapt mangy advanced networking features and functionalities [25]. 
The main design issues of NoCs include packet format, NoC topology, switching 
technique, routing strategies, flow control and quality of service (QoS) requirement 
[12]. 
2.2.1 Packet Format 
Packet format defines the structure of the basic data units in a NoC system. Since 
the data flow in NoC is based on packet switching, the format will make a significant 
difference to the hardware design. Typically, a packet will be further divided into 
several sequential flits, which are the minimum data units in NoC communication 
[23]. A packet will consist of header flit, payload flit and tail flit. The header flit 
usually contains key information of a packet, such as source and destination; the 
payload flit only carries the general transmitted data and tail flit is used to 
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differentiate the boundary of two packets. The flit format is illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4 Generic Packet Flit Format (a) Header Flit Format (b) Payload & Tail Flit Format 
2.2.2 Topology 
 
Figure 2-5 Basic NoC Topologies (Source: [22]) 
Topology defines how NoCs are organized. Each node is composed of a router, a 
NI and an IP core. From the communication perspective, there are various topologies 
for NoC architectures. These topologies include mesh, torus, ring, octagon, tree and 
other irregular interconnection networks. Some sample topologies are shown in 
Figure 2-5. 2-D mesh topology is adopted in most NoC designs, as it is proved to be 
more efficient in terms of latency, power consumption and ease of implementation 
than other topologies [22]. 
2.2.3 Packet Switching Techniques 
Packet switching technique determines how the packets are forwarded and 
transferred through the NoC network. When the first NoC was proposed in early 
14 
 
2000s, circuit switching was preferred. To execute circuit switching, a path from 
source to destination is informed prior to transfer by reserving the routers and links 
before packet transfer. All data will follow the exact same path and the path is torn 
down after the packet transfer is completed. Currently, most of NoC implementations 
are based on packet switching. In packet switching, all the packets are transmitted 
without reserving the entire path. Packet switched networks can further be classified 
as wormhole, store and forward, and cut through [25]. 
2.2.4 Routing Scheme 
Routing schemes are different from the concept of switching techniques. A 
routing algorithm defines the exact route or path for the data from source to 
destination rather than the way how the data are transferred. Routing scheme can be 
generally classified into deterministic routing and adaptive routing. In the 
deterministic routing, all packets follow the same route between a given pair of source 
and destination and data deadlock can be easily avoided. Unlike deterministic routing, 
adaptive routing may dynamically update or change the route for packets to reduce 
congestion, but requires special attention to avoid deadlock and livelock. In current 
NoC design, most packet switched networks utilize deterministic routing such as XY 
routing [6]. 
2.2.5 Flow Control 
End-to-end flow control characterizes the packet movement along the NoC. A 
NoC system may have lots of buffer or memory locally inside the NIs and routers. 
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When the packets are transferring through the network, they are stored temporarily in 
the buffering memory and wait for next step processing. In this sense, flow control is 
necessary to guarantee that these buffers will not overflow. Traditional end to end 
flow control schemes have credit based scheme and ACK based scheme [25]. 
2.2.6 Quality-of-Service 
Quality-of-Service (QoS) refers to the levels of guarantees given for data transfer. 
Goossensens et al. define two types of QoS in [26]: best-effort (BE) and guaranteed 
service (GS). With best-effort NoCs, only completion of the communication is 
ensured and data are transferred as soon as they are ready; with guaranteed service 
NoCs, some extra services or properties are ensured, such as the correctness of data, 
the completion of transaction and the error free communication. 
2.2.7 On-chip Interconnect Protocols 
As mentioned in 2.1, the front end of network interface typically is implemented 
as industrial on-chip standards or protocols. This feature allows NI to separate the IP 
cores from the whole network. As a result, designers can focus on the design of 
various processing IPs without concerning the integration of NoC with IP cores. The 
IP cores can be in a “plug-and-play” fashion for better reusability and performance 
[27]. 
However, the on-chip communication protocols were first designed for SoC 
applications and bus centric connection. Integrating heterogeneous IP cores in a SoC 
often requires the insertion of glue logic, and standards of on-chip bus protocols were 
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developed to avoid this problem [28]. As we are migrating to the era of 
multi-processor SoC (MPSoC) and NoC, the on-chip protocols are also being 
modified and developed to adapt the demands of NoC. This section overviews the 
popular standardized on-chip interconnect protocols such as AMBA AXI [2], 
CoreConnect, Wishbone [4] and Open Core Protocol (OCP) [3]. 
 AMBA (Advanced Micro-controller Bus Architecture) is a standard devised by 
ARM Limited to support efficient on-chip communication for ARM processors. 
AMBA is hierarchically organized into system and peripheral bus segments, 
mutually connected via bridges. AMBA does not define the method of arbitration, 
instead, it allows the arbiter to be designed to meet the applications needs. AMBA 
is also a multi-bus system and several distinct buses are defined in the AMBA 
specification: ACE (Advanced Coherency Extensions), AHB (Advanced 
High-performance Bus), APB (Advanced Peripheral Bus) and AXI (Advanced 
eXtensible Interface)[2]. Nowadays, AMBA AXI is already one of the leading 
on-chip interconnect systems used in high-performance FPGAs, MPSoCs and 
NoCs. 
 CoreConnectis a bus architecture developed by IBM to ease the integration and 
reuse of processors, system and peripheral cores [3]. CoreConnect is 
hierarchically comprised of a processor local bus (PLB), an on-chip peripheral bus 
(OPB) and a device control register bus (DCRB). These three buses provide an 




 Wishbone bus architecture was first developed by Silicore Corpation, and now is 
maintained by OpenCores organization [4]. In 2003, it was released to public for 
free. Wishbone does not define hierarchical buses, but defines the master and 
slave interfaces. It also supports different types of transaction, such as read/write. 
Designer can choose the arbitration mechanism to fit the application need. 
 Open Core Protocol is a standard defined by OCP-IP. Unlike other bus centric 
architecture, OCP is a comprehensive, bus-independent and configurable interface 
standard between IP cores and on-chip communication subsystems. It is also 
openly licensed and a designer can select only those signals and features from the 




CHAPTER 3  
PROPOSED NI DESIGN 
The NI design guidelines were summarized and a generic NI architecture was 
presented in [23], and various NI implementations have been extensively reported in 
[23,25, 34-35, 37-39].The state-of-art NI design includes more than the basic 
functionalities of synchronization and protocol wrapping. Advanced networking 
functionalities, such as routing schemes, quality-of-service (QoS), flow control and 
error management, begin to be incorporated into the NI. Different hardware 
optimizations for latency, power and area are also considered in the previous 
works[12]. In this chapter we illustrate the details of our proposed NI baseline design 
based on previous works. 
3.1 Overview of Generic NI Design 
IP cores are typically categorized into Master and Slave IPs [23]. In a NoC 
infrastructure, Master IPs are active processing elements such as Reduced Instruction 
Set Computing (RISC) or DSP processors. Slave IPs are passive data recipients such 
as memory and I/O peripherals. Since NoC is known as a transaction-based and 
message-passing communication paradigm, only Master IPs can generate transaction 
requests and Slave IPs only receive the requests and send back proper responses to 
Master IPs. To meet different demands of Master and Slave, bi-directional Initiator 
and Target NIs are designed for Master and Slave IPs, respectively. Initiator NIs are 
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connected to Master IPs to convert IP request transactions into NoC traffic and 
translate the packets received from network; in contrast, Target NIs only receive 
requests from network and respond the Master according to the requests. 




Figure 3-1 Overview of network interface (a) Initiator NI (b) Target NI 
As shown in Figure 3-1, Initiator and Target NIs present a mirrored architecture to 
each other. There are two fundamental separations in a generic NI structure: each NI 
contains an upstream transmitter path and a downstream receiver path; kernel and 
shell are also distinguished for NoC and IP core specified issues, respectively. A NI 
shell implements the socket protocol to handshake with IP cores and forward the 
requests and data to next-stage kernel. Therefore, a protocol specific shell is needed 
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for each IP core connected to the NoC. A NI kernel packetizes data from shell, and at 
the same time, depacketizes the response from the receiving path. A state-of-art NI 
kernel also handles flow control and routing. The separation of kernel and shell 
minimizes the effort of supporting various sockets when needed and keeping the 
kernel structure unchanged. In other words, whichever protocol, bus size, clock 
frequency that the IP core is using, all modules in the infrastructure may communicate 
with each other [12]. The transmitter and receiver paths are loosely coupled: 
whenever a request is processed, the receive path is notified; whenever a response is 
received, the transmit path is unblocked. 
3.2 Application of OCP to NI Design 
Table 3-1 Comparison of On-chip Protocols 
Standard CoreConnect AMBA OCP Wishbone 
Interconnect Shared Bus Shared Bus Point-to-Point 
Crossbar/Shared 
Bus/Point-to-Point 




























As IP blocks are characterized typically by memory-mapped interfaces, most 
NoCs are based on message-passing networks. This demands core-centric sockets and 
the corresponding protocol wrapper between the shell and IP cores. In 2.2.7, we 
overview the most popular on-chip protocols including AMBA, CoreConnect, 
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Wishbone and OCP. Table 3-1 provides a more detailed comparison of their features. 
Among all these standards, we adopt OCP in our particular design for several 
reasons. First, it is freely distributed and no license is needed; second, OCP is bus 
independent and core centric, and this feature is more suitable in separating the core 
from network fabric in a NoC design than other standards; third, OCP is highly 
flexible and configurable, and allows designer to select appropriate signals and 
features according to designs. OCP is increasingly popular in the NoC design and has 
potential to be utilized in future NoC benchmarks [29]. 
3.2.1 OCP Signaling and Encoding 
The OCP protocol defines a point-to-point interface between Master and Slave IP 
cores. Only the master can presents request commands and the slave responds to the 
commands either by accepting data or providing feedback. OCP facilitates basic 
transfer mode with optional extensions such as burst, tag and thread. Burst extension 
has been proved to be a key feature of current NI design given its high bandwidth 
usage and low jitter [30]. A data packet is further partitioned into multiple small data 
flits in a burst transaction, so the transmission does not need to wait until enough 
space is available for an entire packet. Therefore, the latency is reduced and the speed 
increases. 
Our design supports the precise burst over imprecise burst to facilitate further 
hardware optimization. The burst length is known before at the start of the burst, and 
it can be either single burst or multiple data. The detailed signaling of OCP is 
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presented in Table 3-2. Basic OCP signals include MCmd, MData, MAddr, 
SCmdAccept, SResp and SData. The designer can also select different extension 
signals according to demands. 
Table 3-2 OCP Specification Signals 
Group Name Width Driver Function 
Basic MAddr configurable master Transfer Address 
MCmd 3 master Transfer Command 
MData configurable master Transfer Data 
MDataValid 1 master Write Data Valid 
SDataAccept 1 slave Accept Write Data 
SCmdAccept 1 slave Accept Command 
SData configurable slave Transfer Data 
SResp 2 slave Transfer Response 
Burst MBurstLength configurable master Transfer Burst Length 
MBurstSeq 3 master Transfer Burst Sequence 
MReqLast 1 master Last Write Request 
MDataLast 1 master Last Write Data 
SRespLast 1 slave Last Read Response 
Threads MConnID configurable master Connection Identifier 
MThreadID configurable master Request Thread Identifier 
SThreadID configurable slave Response Thread Identifier 
MDataThreadID configurable master Write Data Thread Identifier 
Sideband SInterrupt 1 slave Slave Interrupt 
 
3.2.2 OCP Timing Diagram 
OCP specification also defines the timing diagram for various data transfers such 
as simple read and write, non-post write, read with handshake and response [24]. In 
our particular design, we mainly use burst based read and write transaction.  
As shown in Figure 3-2, the Master IP starts the burst write by driving WR on 
MCmd, the first address of the burst on MAddr, valid data on MData, the burst length 
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on MBurstLength. The Slave IP will assert SCmdAccept as soon as the MData is 
accepted.
 
Figure 3-2 Timing diagram for burst write transaction (Source: [24]) 
In the burst read transaction, the Master IP starts a read request by driving RD on 
MCmd, a valid address on MAddr, MBurstLength, and asserting MBurstPrecise. 
MBurstLength, MBurstSeq and MBurstPrecise must be kept constant during the burst. 
MReqLast must be de-asserted until the last request in the burst. The timing diagram 
is shown is Figure 3-3.If the Slave IP is ready to accept one request, it captures the 
address of request and keeps SCmdAccept asserted. The Slave IP also responds to the 
request by driving DVA on SResp and the read data on SData. The slave must keep 





Figure 3-3 Timing diagram for burst read transaction (Source: [24]) 
3.3 Switching Technique and Routing Scheme 
We use the most popular packet-based wormhole switching in a 4×4 mesh 
topology NoC. A packet is transmitted flit by flit and flows through the network. For 
regular 2-D mesh topology, the deterministic XY routing scheme is well suited for on 
chip communication [48-49]. XY routing is a dimension order routing, which routes 
packets first in horizontal direction to the correct column and then in vertical direction 
to the receiver. In the XY routing, five bi-directional ports in each router is encoded as 
a 3-bit binary code, which is shown as Figure 3-4. Each 3-bit code represents one hoc 
of current flit to the output port of router. In Figure 3-5, the XY routing path from 
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node A to node B is presented in red. The routing information is saved in routing 
tables and packet headers.
 
3.4 Packet Format 
 
(a) 
Figure 3-5 X-Y routing from node A to 
node B router 






Figure 3-6 NI packet format (a) request packet (b) response packet 
Packet format for NoCs tightly affects the NI control logic design, packet 
boundary scanning, and the area overhead of the NI. To reduce design complexity and 
balance cost and performance, we define two types of packets: request packets and 
response packets. The formats for these two types are shown in Figure 3-6. Request 
packet is always sent from a Master IP to a Slave IP and response packet is from a 
Slave IP to a Master IP. Each packet are divided into header, payload and tail flits. 
Two bits are used to present the flit type. Typically, a header flit contains control 
information and routing information. In our request packet, the header is composed of 
two flits. The control information encrypts OCP signals subset. The routing 
information presents route hops in XY-routing. If each hop is encoded with three bits, 
18-bit routing information can support 6 hops in total, which is able to accommodate 
our 4×4 mesh topology. Reserved bits are for future extension. 
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3.5 Flow Control 
 
Figure 3-7 Credit-based end-to-end flow control mechanism (a) credit counter decrements 
when one flit is transmitted (b) slave IP core accepts received flit (c) credit counter 
increments when receiving feedback from slave IP 
Initiator and Target NIs demand buffers to perform packet encapsulation and 
de-capsulation. Therefore, end to end flow control is necessary in NI to prevent buffer 
overflow in the receiver end, which could further lead NoC system crush. 
Credit-based and ACK/NACK are commonly used mechanism to avoid the buffer 
overflow at the destination node [25]. In the credit-based flow control, a credit 
counter is implemented in the transmitter to initialize the available buffer space at 
destination. The credit counter reduces one whenever the transmitter forwards a flit, 
shown as Figure 3-7 (a). If the count reaches zero, the buffer at the destination node 
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reaches the full status and thus no more flits are allowed. When one flit is consumed, 
the counter increases one. The credit is either piggyback in the response packet or 
provided by an extra link, shown as Figure 3-7 (c). 
3.6 Initiator NI 
 
Figure 3-8 Block diagram of Initiator NI 
The main tasks of Initiator NI are to receive the request from master IP core, 
encapsulate into a packet, transmit the packet flit by flit to the network, and receive 
response from the remote slave IP core. The proposed Initiator NI is shown in Figure 
3-8. The transmitter is composed of header and payload builder, a routing table, 
asynchronous FIFOs, control logic and flit arbiters. The receiver consists of receiver 
FIFO, depacketizer and receive control unit. Among these sub-components, central 
FSM control, depacketizer and receive control are all FSM based control logic. 
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3.6.1 Header & Payload Builder 
The header and payload builder mainly handle the handshake with the Master IP, 
accept and packetize the OCP signals presented by the Master IP. Particularly, payload 
header encapsulates the MData signal into payload and tail flits, and header builder 
encapsulates the rest of OCP signals into control information of the header flit. As 
soon as such process is done, the flits are ready to write into the transmitter FIFO. 
Figure 3-9 (a) and (b) present the gate level implementation of header and payload 
builder, respectively. The SCmdAccept comes from the NI FSM and will be asserted 
when the NI is ready to accept new transaction requests. The OCP signals except the 
MData will be registered by the header builder to form the header flit; and the MData 
will be registered by the payload builder to form the payload or tail flit. Tail flit is 
generated when the MReqLast from Master IP is asserted. 
  
Figure 3-9 Packet builder (a) header flit builder (b) payload & tail flit builder 
3.6.2 Routing Table 
Routing table, or look-up table (LUT), is a local memory in Initiator to store the 
routing paths to other slaves within the NoC [31]. A routing table in NI is typically 
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implemented as a combination of content addressable memory (CAM) and random 
access memory (RAM), which is shown as Figure 3-10 [32, 33]. The global address 
of IP cores is written into the CAM and the routing path information is store in the 
RAM. When the MAddr is presented by the Master IP, CAM searches its contents to 
find a match and the routing path associated with global address will be retrieved 
from the routing table, encapsulated as a header flit and sent to the FIFO. In our 
design, the routing information is expressed as multiple 3-bit binary hocs.  
 
Figure 3-10 Conceptual view of a CAM-RAM based routing table 
CAM is a special type memory for high speed searching and widely used in data 
compression, network switching, IP address filter and memory mapping [34-36].It can 
be either configurable or hard wired [37]. Unlike previous designs in [32-33], we refer 
to a configurable register-based CAM in our baseline architecture. Since a certain IP 
address may correspond to several different routing paths, the longest prefix matching 
method is utilized in a ternary CAM [34, 38]. As shown in Figure 3-11, the data_bits 
that store IP address and the search_bits are fed into the match line comparator bit by 
bit to check if they are identical. The care_bits signals are used to mask certain bits 
from the comparator comparison and a specific line will be selected if the longest 
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prefix bits are matched. The match lines output from CAM is in one-hot code, and 
therefore needs to be encoded as binary address before searching the routing path in 
the RAM. 
  
(a)                             (b)    
Figure 3-11 Longest prefix matching in ternary CAM: (a) single word cell unit of ternary 
CAM; (b) match line Comparator 
3.6.3 Central Finite State Machine Control 
The central FSM is the main control logic of transmitter in our proposed NI. The 
FSM is synchronous to the OCP clock, and is responsible for reordering and writing 
the flits into transmit FIFO after packetization. The details of state transition are 
presented in Figure 3-12. Since the Master IP may have write and read transactions, 
the FSM is therefore divided into two branches for the two types of transactions, 
respectively. In the write transaction branch, two header flits containing routing and 
control information and multiple payload flits are written into the asynchronous FIFO 
sequentially. The suspension states are designed to prevent writing when the FIFO is 
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full. In the read transaction branch, the header flits are written but there are no 
payload flits in read transaction. When the remote end provides response flits, the 
FSM will be reset to the idle state. Similarly, suspension states are design to prevent 
FIFO from reading when the FIFO is empty. 
 
Figure 3-12 Central FSM control logic 
3.6.4 Flit Arbiter 
 
Figure 3-13 State diagram of flit arbiter 
The flit arbiter is also a simple control logic but synchronous to the network clock. 
It receives the flits coming out of the transmit FIFO and sends flits to the NoC 
network. Figures 3-13 shows the detailed state transition. As long as the FIFO is not 
empty, flit arbiter will fetch and transmit the flits that are stored in FIFO. The credit 
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counter is also implemented with flit arbiter to realize the flow control described in 
3.5. 
3.6.5 Asynchronous FIFO 
The OCP specific IP core and NoC network are typically operated at different 
clock frequencies, so an OCP clock and a network clock are defined for these two 
clock domains, respectively. Asynchronous FIFOs are therefore necessary in both 
transmitter and receiver paths for flit queuing, reordering and clock domain crossing. 
 
Figure 3-14 Dual-port RAM based FIFO architecture (Source: [39]) 
Dual-port RAM with asynchronous read and write pointers is a popular FIFO 
architecture, as shown in Figure 3-14. We adopt a similar design described in [40, 39] 
with binary and Gray code combined pointer to support high frequency 
(>250MHz).The FIFO depth is largely depended on the speed of both clock domains. 
Increasing the FIFO depth can help to accommodate longer size of packets and reduce 
the packet miss rate, but it also increases the power and area overhead [23, 41]. 
34 
 
3.6.6 Depacketizer & Receive Control 
 
Figure 3-15 State diagram of receiver control 
 
Figure 3-16 State diagram of depacketizer 
The sub modules of receive control and depacketizer are control logic in the 
receiver path. The receiver path facilitates the reversed operation. The response flits 
from the Slave IP are synchronized with the receiver FIFO and then depacketized as 
handshake signals at the OCP interface. Since the flits from the Slave IP can be either 
35 
 
valid data or fail response, the control logics are also partitioned into two branches, as 
illustrated in Figure 3-15 and Figure 3-16, respectively. 
3.7 Target NI 
 
Figure 3-17 Block diagram of Target NI 
 Implementation of the Target NI (shown in Fig. 3.17) is opposite to that of Initiator 
NI in Figure 3-17. The main difference between target and initiator NIs is: the former 
one is an OCP master and the latter one is an OCP slave. The OCP signals asserted by 
the initiator NI (target NI) are complimentary to the target NI (initiator NI). Since 
Slave IPs can only passively receive requests, Master IPs’ source address is retrieved 
from the request packet to provide routing information for response path. So Figure 
3-17 of Target NI presents a mirrored architecture to the Initiator NI, which also 
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includes header/payload builder, asynchronous FIFO, flit arbiter, central FSM control, 
receive control logic and depacketizer. 
3.8 Implementation and Simulation Results 
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We implemented the proposed NI design with Verilog HDL and synthesized with 
Synopsys Design Compiler. Table 3-3 presents the general overview and comparison 
with other works. We adopt IBM 0.18µm CMOS-7RF technology to give a closer 
view. The maximum frequency, store-forward latency, area and power consumption 
were evaluated based on the synthesized netlist. Our implementation shows the 
comparable performance in terms of low cost and high speed with that in 







Figure 3-18 Implementation details of different modules in NI (a) Area contribution to overall 
design (b) power contribution to overall design 
Figure 3-18 (a) shows the complexity of each sub-module inside our NI, and 
Figure 3-18 (b) presents the contribution of each module to the overall power. We can 
conclude that the memory elements including asynchronous FIFO and LUT are the 
most costly inside a NI (over 80% in both cases). Our baseline design fixes the depth 
of asynchronous FIFO to16 support 16-flit long packet at maximum. As the FIFO 
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depth is highly parametric, it can be easily configured to a larger depth. Larger FIFO 
depth is more reliable and has smaller miss rate when NI operating at high frequencies, 
but it also increase the overhead [23]. Figure 3-19 shows such increasing trend on 
area versus the FIFO depth. Selecting an appropriate FIFO depth is a design tradeoff 
among speed, reliability and overhead. 
 




CHAPTER 4  
HARDWARE TROJAN ATTACK MODEL 
The hardware attack framework or threat model to NoC was first discussed in [11, 
26-27]. HT attacks in NoCs can be generally categorized into three categories as 
follows. 
 Denial of Service: A DoS attack attempts to degrade system performance. The 
adversary may frequently send malicious requests to the victim of attack, resulting 
in extra traffic congestions and the increase on network transmission latency. 
More precisely, HTs can cause bandwidth reduction, incorrect routing path, 
livelock and deadlock.  
 Extract of Secret Information: Secret information extraction means that HT 
facilitates hackers to steal sensitive or critical information from authorized 
memory or registers, such as the crypto keys. With the assistance from HTs, secret 
information can be extracted by unauthorized read request, buffer overflow or 
duplicating read operation to transmit data to an un-trusted destination.  
 Hijacking: Hijacking refers to altering the regular execution flow or modifying the 
system configuration so that specific tasks set by the attacker can be executed. 
One example for Hijacking is to exploit buffer overflow to bypass the digital serial 
code in video games. 
 The tangible security attack examples provided in [11, 26-27] are either not 
thorough or in conceptual or abstract level. Other security discussions reported in [28, 
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30-32] either only study the attacks on memory blocks or assumes that the attack 
come from external source. In fact, the HTs can also be inserted in NoC infrastructure 
as well. In this section, we summarize a practical HT design approach and attack 
model specifically for NI. Particularly, we analyze and propose multiple rare 
switching nodes which can potentially be the HT trigger. Several meaningful HT 
payload locations are also presented and evaluated. 
4.1 HT Models in Previous Designs 
DARPA issued its first call for the study of hardware Trojan. In [15-16, 63-64], 
different methods were proposed to classify HTs based on various characteristics, 
such as insertion phase, trigger mechanism, payload effect and location. HT can also 
be either digital or analog [8]. Since the NoC infrastructure is mainly a synthesizable 
digital design, here we only limit our discussion to digital HTs. 
 A basic HT model consists of two parts: (a) an activation mechanism referred as 
HT trigger; (b) an intrusive circuit referred as HT payload to affect original design 
[65-66].HT payload can be simple logic gate such as XOR to flip or change the logic 
value of original logic. However, the HT trigger is more complicated since the HT 
needs to be triggered under a certain condition or over a long period of time. Several 




Figure 4-1 Examples of HT with various triggers (a) combinational (b) synchronous counter 
(c) asynchronous counter (d) hybrid (e) FSM based 
Digitally triggered HTs can be again classified into combinational and sequential 
types. Combinational Trojans shown as in Figure 4-1 (a) are activated by the 
occurrence of rare logic value combinations. The occurrence of the condition 
           at the trigger nodes causes the bit flip at node    . Sequentially 
triggered HT, on the other hand, are activated by the occurrence of a sequence or a 
period of continuous operation. The free running synchronous trigger in Figure 4-1 (b) 
is the simplest example. The Trojan will be triggered when the counter counts to 
  clock cycles working as a time-bomb. The clock in Figure 4-1 (b) can also be 
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replaced by a logic gate to make it an asynchronous counter Trojan as shown in 
Figure 4-1 (c). The counter will only increment when the combination         
is met. Hybrid counter Trojan in Figure 4.1 (d) combines the features of 
combinational and sequential Trojans. More complex state machine Trojan, shown in 
Figure 4.1(e), is also recently discussed in [47-48]. The Trojan output is activated 
only when reaching the last Trojan state. 
4.2 HT Designs 
The examples discussed in 4.1 widely exist in the HT design of various digital 
applications, such as general purpose processor [18, 69], cryptographic IP [70-72], 
memory [73-74] and communication interfaces [75-76]. These can be configurable IP 
cores within a NoC system, but unfortunately, none of them touch upon the HT design 
in NoC infrastructure. Further, one obvious shortcoming in previous work is that very 
few of the authors consider a practical Trojans that would be able to avoid traditional 
detection such as functional verification, code coverage and post-silicon testing [48, 
49]. For example, the free running synchronous counter Trojan requires large 
area/power overhead to guarantee a certain trigger time, which is not feasible in a 
high speed networking system. Also, most of the designers choose randomly locate 
HTs in the chip and were not able to perform meaningful attacks. So we summarize 
the key features of a practical HT design in NI. 
 Maintain main functionalities of original circuit when it’s not activated 
 Create minimum overhead in terms of power, area and delay 
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 Locate in key points in the circuit to perform meaningful attacks 
 Able to remain dormant in traditional detection techniques such as functional 
verification, code coverage and post-silicon testing 
4.2.1 HT Triggers in NI 
The key idea of HT trigger design is to realize the significant low trigger 
probability with minimum logics. Among the HT trigger examples in 4.1, FSM based 
sequential Trojans have been proven to be extremely stealthy in nature in most recent 
works [17, 68,77].The trigger probability can be exponentially lower by increasing the 
length of rare trigger events. Another advantage of FSM HT is that it can be 
embedded into the existing unused states of the FSM in original circuit. NI is a 
module with numerous FSM based control logics, which creates lots of opportunities 
for HT insertion. We expand the discussion in [17, 68,77] and specify several cases of 
HT shown as in Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2 Various scenarios of FSM based HT insertion 
 The state transition condition of FSM depends on the rare event or rare switching 
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node in original circuit, and therefore does not cause extra overhead. Figure 4-2 (a) 
passes through a series of intermediate states      before activation. Figure 4-2 (b) 
and (c) are slightly different. They will transmit backwards if the trigger condition is 
not met. Figure 4-2 (d) requires all the trigger conditions to be met at each transition. 
In [17, 68,77], the authors also provide an approach to estimate the probability of 
HT trigger and the expected activation time in terms of clock cycles. Let         
     denote the probability of the Trojan transition from state      to   , where 
       and   is the number of D flip-flops used in trigger, the trigger 
probability and activation time can be roughly simulated using a Markov process. 
Table 4-1 gives a summary of HT triggers discussed and their feasibility to 
NI.  denotes the number of rare event used in NI HT design and the trigger 
probability can be roughly estimated using Markov chain. If the multiple trigger 
signals are independent events, the activation time can be estimated using the 
reciprocal of trigger probability. 
Table 4-1 Summary of various HT triggers and feasibility in NI 
HT Type Trigger Probability Activation Time (cycle) Feasibility to NI 
Comb. Trojan    
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 Besides the HT trigger models discussed in 4.1, we can conclude that various 
types of FSM trigger are also perfectly feasible in NI. The number of such sequential 
trigger conditions can be unmanageable large by applying different trigger sequences, 
which help the Trojan hidden in conventional detection. If the attackers are intelligent 
enough, the trigger nodes can be carefully picked from the original NI circuit, which 
will be further discussed in 4.3. 
4.2.2 HT Payloads in NI 
We summarize several types of payload circuits in terms of their effects in NI, 
which are shown in Figure 4-3. They can be single gate or gate array applied to 
multiple bits of the intruded signals. XOR type payload in Figure 4.3 (a) typically 
flips the logic value of original signal; AND type payload in (b) masks the signal 
when trigger asserts; dually, OR type payload can force victim signal to logic 1 in (c); 
MUX type payload in (d) can replace the target circuit with pre-set values and 
DeMUX type payload can extract security sensitive information to eavesdropper. The 
payload locations mainly are carefully chosen to perform meaningful attack and 





Figure 4-3 Examples of various HT payloads 
4.3 Potential Trigger Signals for HTs in NIs 
4.3.3 Potential Trigger Signal 1: Reset Signal 
In the NI, the Reset signal is typically required to clear storage elements; more 
specifically, they are header & payload registers, asynchronous FIFO, routing table, 
and state registers of FSM. Like many other digital systems, the transition frequency 
of the reset signal is extremely low; thus this signal has a potential to be utilized in the 
HT trigger circuit. The reset-based HTs can easily escape from the HT examination 
tests, if HT designers use the reset signal as an input for a sequential HT, which is not 
triggered at the first transition time of the reset signal. 
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4.3.4 Potential Trigger Signal2: Unused States in an FSM 
 
Figure 4-4 FSM for initiator NI. Signals on arches are OCP signals and FIFO full indicator 
In NI, a finite state machine (FSM) is typically needed to coordinate packet read 
and write operation. Figure 4-4 shows the central FSM for a NI compatible with OCP 
protocol. That FSM is composed of ten legal states, thus requiring four bits to 
represent the states. As four bits can represent 16 states in total, six states will remain 
as unused. Unused states in a FSM are common for a complicated control system. To 
minimize hardware cost, such unused states are typically remarked as unspecified 
state in logic optimization. Consequently, those unused states could be utilized by a 
hacker as a HT trigger. Ideally, the state transition only happens within the legal states. 
However, under certain circumstance such as voltage drop, crosstalk and substrate 
noise, the FSM may switch to an unused state.  
Although most of the FSMs have self-recovery and protection mechanism, the 
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transition to unused states is hard to be prevented completely. If a HT trigger circuit 
takes advantage of such low-probability events, the HT effect cannot be easily 
discovered by the functional verification.  
One example of unused state transition can be caused by soft errors. In a  -bit FSM, 
we assume that only   out of 2k possible states are in use. The soft error rate is in 
the range of           . If one FSM state bit is flipped by a soft error, the 
probability of illegal transition due to soft error can be roughly estimated in equation 
(4-1). 
       
             
   
  
    (4-1) 
4.3.5 Potential Trigger Signal 3: FIFO-Full Signal 
 
Figure 4-5 FIFO full caused by writing burst 
FIFO buffers are essential components for data storage in NoC design. In NI, 
FIFO is used to queue packets, as the IP core clock frequency is different with the 
NoC clock frequency. The FIFO depth is a tradeoff between hardware cost and NoC 
performance [40]. Increasing the FIFO size can optimize the NoC latency and 
throughput at the cost of increased chip area and power consumption.  
As the write and read operations may execute at different frequencies, the speed of 
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write-in operation should be no more than that of read-out operation; otherwise the 
FIFO will be always full. Let’s use   and   todenote the clock frequencies for write 
and read operations, respectively, and use    and    to represent the write-in and 
read-out data rates, respectively. To avoid FIFO full, one should design a FIFO that 
meet the requirement expressed in equation (4-2). 
              (4-2) 
However, the constraint in equation (4) only works well for average cases. If 
writing burst happens and the FIFO depth is not large enough, the read operation with 
the average read-out rate   will cause FIFO full. As shown in Figure 4-5, in 2Nclock 
cycles, there are       consecutive write operations. However, during the time 
period of     
 
  
, there are only     
 
  
      read operations. As a result, the 
minimum FIFO depth for NI should be equal to the expression in (4-3). 
                    
 
  
                (4-3) 
If the FIFO depth in the NI implementation is less than the value indicated in 
equation (4-3), the FIFO will be full occasionally. This is because the requirement in 
(4-2) is for average cases. In the specification stage,    and   are obtained based on 
infinite time. In reality, the peak value of the read and write speed may temporally 
exceed the defined data rates for a short period of time. Such temporal event could be 
used in HT trigger design. 
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4.4 Potential Payload Locations in NI 
 
Figure 4-6 HT payload objectives on NoC network interface 
We classify the HT payload objectives into three categories: storage elements, 
computation or flow control units, and transmission channels. The procedure to 
change the content in each category is slightly different. The influence of the HT 
payload location in each category is different, as well.  
Figure 4-6 shows possible HT payload injection locations on a NoC NI. In the 
storage elements, similar to router, one HT payload can change the FIFO content, 
such as flit type, source/destination node address. Changes in the routing table can 
manipulate the list of trusted IP cores and secure routing paths. The protocol specific 
signals can be changed in the payload and header building registers. HT invasion on 
these storage elements can authorize the access to restricted memory area and thus 
cause secret information leakage and hijacking. HT influence on the control logic 
such as FSM and de-packetizer can disorder the flit sequence in a packet, which 
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further causes system FSM remaining in the same state or even be crashed. 
4.4.1 Payload Objective 1: Latching Global Clock 
 
Figure 4-7 HT payload at clock tree circuitry 
 The clock distribution network can be regarded as the most critical module in a 
digital system. It provides global clock source to rest of the circuitry for 
synchronization and in most cases, several local clocks are derived from the global 
clock through a PLL. Shown as in Figure4-7, if the HT attack happens at clock 
circuitry by latching or freezing it up, the entire chip does not function unless the 
clock is re-enabled [46]. It may also possibly cause glitches when the HT trigger 
transits from dormant to active. Either way will cause severe impact to the rest of 
system. This Trojan can be inserted at design as well as fabrication phase and can be 
described at gate level. 
4.4.2 Payload Objective 2: Damaging Flit Type Information 
Bit stream transmitted over the NoC fabric is organized with a certain format, i.e. 
packet. One packet is typically composed of one (or two) header flit(s), several 
payload flits and one tail flit. Figure 4-8 shows one popular packet format. Other 
formats can be found in [41-43]. No matter what format is used in packetization, a 
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common feature in all packet formats is a few bits to indicate the flit type: header, 
payload, or tail. Two, at least, reserved positions on each flit are used to differentiate 
the flit types, as the router relies on these two bits to determine whether and how to 
compute the next routing path or whether the current routing channel should be 
released.  
 
Figure 4-8 Transmit packet format in proposed NI design 
 
Figure 4-9 HT payload at FIFO register chain 
The HT payload circuit to damage the flit type bits can be any circuit that leads to a 
stuck-at-0/1 or logic flipping error. HT payloads 1 and 2 shown in Fig. 4-9 are 
examples for stuck-at and logic flipping payload circuits, respectively. If the 32nd flit 
bit is muted by an active HT inserted in the FIFO register chain, the header flit cannot 
be recognized by router, thus leading to a packet loss. We propose a pseudo-code 
Reserve1 1 MCmd MAddr MBurstLength MBurstSeq MBurstPrec
33 32
31 29 28 13 12 9 8 5
MBurstSing
04 2




















based HT attack model in Figure 4-10. The key idea of this model is to modify the flit 
bits representing the flip type. The logic flipping can be executed at gate level or 
register transfer level. 
 
Figure 4-10Pseudo code for HT damaging flit type information 
4.4.3 Payload Objective 3: Altering Routing Path 
 
Figure 4-11 An example caused by an HT payload on the node current address. Solid red line 
is original routing path. Dashed blue line is livelock path caused by a HT that changes router 
(2, 1) current address to (2, 2) 
 
Malicious insertion can intentionally change the routing path either routing table 
//Pseudo code for the HT attack model of losing flit type information 
if(HT trigger condition is true) 
    HT_payload <= on; 
else 
    HT_payload <= off; 
//HT injection location 
if(HT_payload == on) 
case(loss type): 
            Header lost: 
flit[32]<=and(flit[32],!HT_payload) at time Tj 
            Tail lost: 
flit[33]<=and(flit[33],!HT_payload) at time Tj 
            Packet fission: 
flit[32]<=xor(flit[32], HT_payload); at time Tj?j+pktlen 
    flit[33]<=xor(flit[33], HT_payload); at time Tj?j+pktlen 
endcase 
else 




for adaptive routing to cause deadlock or livelock, thus wasting system resources and 
degrading NoC performance. 
 Livelock Example 
Livelock means the packet is traveling through network but does not get any close 
to the destination. Livelock is typically caused by illegal routing turns. Let’s use the 
most popular routing algorithm, XY routing, to introduce the possible way to 
introduce a HT payload that causes illegal turns. The router current address 
(Addr_X/Y_curr) is hardwired for XY routing path computation. In XY routing, a 
packet first goes through the hops on the X direction, and then goes through the hops 
on the Y direction. As the hard wired signal does not have switching activities, the 
modification by rarely-trigged HT on those signals is hard to be detected by 
traditional test approaches and code coverage analysis methods.  
We use a mesh NoC with 16 nodes (i.e. 16 IP cores) to explain how a livelock 
happens if an HT alters the current address. The livelock example is depicted in 
Figure 4-11. Assume IP core 5 attempts to send a packet Px to IP core 13, using XY 
routing. The original routing path for Px is starting from router 5, through router 9 and 
ending at router 13. The two-dimension representation for those three routers are (1,1), 
(2,1) and (3,1), respectively. If a trigged HT changes the hardwired current address of 
router (2,1) to a new address (2,2), now the packet Px will go through the west output 
port of router (2,2) and reach the east input port of router (2,0). As the destination of 
Px is IP core 13, Px is directed back to router (2,1) based on the rule of XY routing 
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algorithm. However, the current address of router (2,1) is maliciously hardwired as 
(2,2), the packet Px is transmitted back to router (2,0) again. Consequently, the packet 
Px comes back and forth between router (2,0) and router (2,1) until the HT effect is 
gone; packet retransmission after using time-out mechanism does not help to resolve 
the problem.  
 
Figure 4-12 Pseudo code for HT attack model: altering packet routing path 
We propose a HT attack model that alters the routing path in NoC. The pseudo 
code for this model is shown in Figure 4-12. We list the potential locations for HT 
insertion and the possible way to modify the content or logic in the vulnerable 
locations. The ways we illustrated in Figure 4-12 are just typical examples. In reality, 
there will be many equivalent approaches to perform similar attacks to alter packet 
routing path. 
//Pseudo code for the HT attack model of altering packet routing path 
if(HT trigger condition is true) 
    HT_payload <= on; 
else 
    HT_payload <= off; 
//HT injection location 
if(HT_payload == on) 
case(Location): 
//----------before route computation------------------ 
        Routing table: 
//Modify content in CAM for routing calculation 
             CAM[legal access request]<= untrusted IP core Address; 
        Flit FIFO: 
//Modify packet destination address bits in header flit 
            FIFO[wr/rd_pointer][27:24]<= untrusted IP core Address; 
        R-R links: 
//Bit flip dest. address when header flit passes over the links. 








4.4.4 Payload Objective 4: Injecting Redundant Packets to Increase Traffic 
Congestion 
 
Figure 4-13 Redundant packet injection caused by a triggered HT in NI (a) Normal packet 
injection from an IP core (b) A redundant packet injection between two valid packets by a HT 
Livelock and deadlock interrupt the NoC normal operation. There is another HT 
attack that purely degrades system performance. In NI, the triggered HT can 
maliciously force one NI duplicating every packet it submitted. If the consecutive 
packet arrives before the end of the duplicated packet, the starting time for that 
consecutive packet will be delayed, as shown in Figure 4-13.  
 
Figure 4-14 The impact of HT on latency (a) Average packet latency comparison for w/ and 
w/o HT induced redundant packet injection (b) Percentage of increased average packet 
latency by HTs 
We conducted an experiment to quantitatively compare the performance 
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degradation caused by HT-induced packet redundancy. In router, we randomly 
selected one router and inserted a HT on one input port. The triggered HT duplicates 
any packet going through that port and connects that packet to another output port. If 
a deterministic routing algorithm is used, the duplicated packet will be bounced back 
and continue the rest of hops till reach its destination. In NI, we randomly selected 
one NI and allowed that NI duplicating every packet it submitted. As shown in Figure 
4-14, the NI and router having a triggered HT cause the increase on the average 
latency. A higher packet injection rate leads to a larger average latency because of the 
increased traffic congestions. The latency increasing caused by the HT in router is 
higher than that caused by the HT in NI, when the packet injection rate is less than 
0.12 packets per cycle. More precisely, as shown in Figure 4-14, the percentage of 
increased latency from w/o HT effect to w/ HT effect on NI is less significant than 
that on router. One of the reason is, the packet duplicated at NI is limited when packet 
injection rate is low; however, a router in the middle of NI has a higher packet 
throughput than a NI; thus, packet duplication on a router is more frequent than that 
on a NI. Consequently, the latency increased on router is severer than at on a NI. 
Figure 4-14 (b) also shows that, if a packet injection rate at each NI increases, the 
packet latency caused by HT at NI exceeds that caused by router. The variation on the 
percentage of increased latency from HT at router is less than that on a NI, as a nature 




Figure 4-15 Pseudo code for HT attack model: duplicating packet transmission 
We propose a pseudo code based model for this type HT. As shown in Figure 
4-15, the packet duplication can be either implemented in router output port or NI 
FIFO. This model arises NoC designers’ attention to strengthen their protocol by 
adding redundancy checks. 
4.4.5 Payload Objective 5: Causing Buffer Overflow or Overwriting Memory 
The dual-port RAM based FIFO buffer is a critical component for clock 
synchronization and flit queuing in NI. The FIFO full and empty signals are generated 
by comparing the read and write pointers to indicate the memory availability. The 
pointer comparison is based on circular addressing as shown inFigure4-16(a). When 
the write pointer is one word behind the read pointer, the FIFO full signal is asserted. 
//Pseudo code for the HT attack model of duplicating packet transmission 
if(HT trigger condition is true) 
    HT_payload <= on; 
else 
    HT_payload <= off; 
 
//HT payload inserted during routing path calculation in a NoC router 
if(HT_payload == on) 
Req_[E, S, W, N, L]<= Route Computation in Input Port k; 
    Copy ∀Req_i that value is True to ∀Req_j that value is false 
    i,j,k∈[E,S,W,N,L],i≠k,i≠j; 
    Output port i <= Data from Input FIFO k; 
Output port j <= Data from Input FIFO k; 
else 
    Req_[E, S, W, N, L]= Route Computation in Input Port k; 
    Output port i <= Data from Input FIFO k; 
       i,k∈[E,S,W,N,L],i≠k; 
 
//HT payload inserted during packetization in a NoC network interface 
Packetize a packet PKTm with a destination address DestAddr; 
Push PKTm into NI FIFO; 
NI FIFO releases PKTm to NoC fabric 
if(HT_payload == on) 
    FIFO pointer remains same; 
    NI FIFO release PKTm to NoC fabric again; 
    FIFO pointer reduces one; 
else 




Similarly, when the write pointer is one word ahead the read pointer, the FIFO empty 
signal is asserted. 
  
Figure 4-16 Read and write FIFO pointers in (a) normal read and write operation, and (b) HT 
affected situation 
If a HT payload intentionally changes the pointer value, the FIFO will present 
incorrect memory availability signal to the external modules, as shown in 
Figure4-16(b). When a HT payload pushes the write pointer to the used memory 
location, the new incoming flits overwrite the memory and corrupt the previous 
packet, resulting in denial of service.  
 
Figure 4-17 Pseudo code for HT attack model: manipulating FIFO 
The HT attack model for malicious FIFO modification is shown in Figure 4-17. 
//Pseudo code for the HT attack model of FIFO pointers 
if(HT trigger condition is true) 
    HT_payload <= on; 
else 
    HT_payload <= off; 
//HT injection location 
if(HT_payload == on) 
case(FIFO pointer): 
            Write Pointer: 
        Write Pointer <= a certain address behind current address; 
            Read Pointer: 
        Read Pointer <= a certain address ahead of current address; 
endcase 
else 
    Execute normal operations; 
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The simple way to erase the content in FIFO is to change the read and write FIFO 
pointers. The changed FIFO pointer may cause an incomplete packet remain in the 
FIFO forever, unless the NoC has some time-out mechanism to clear the FIFO.  
4.4.6 Payload Objective 5: Modifying Protocol Specific Information 
Industrial on-chip interconnect protocols, such as IBM CoreConnect, ARM AXI 
and OCP, are widely adopted in NoC design. Once the communication protocols 
between IP cores are determined, the exchange packet has to explicitly include the 
information that the specific protocol requires. Otherwise, the received packet cannot 
be de-packetized correctly. The protocol information may be changed by the HTs 
placed in NI.  
We use OCP, an open and free communication protocol [36], as an example.  
The MCmd signal defines the transfer command type of a Master IP in OCP. 
Changing the value of MCmd will damage a regular transaction and cause a series of 
unexpected errors, such as changing a write request to a read request and vice versa. 
MAddr is the transfer address signal in OCP. The adversary can make a packet access 
to a wrong memory address by altering this signal. Table 4-2presents a brief summary 
of HT attacks for basic OCP signals. 
Table 4-2 Basic OCP signals 
OCP Signal Driver Function Possible Trojan Effects 
MCmd Master Transfer command Alter transfer command type 
MAddr Master Transfer address Alter transfer address; Hijacking 
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MData Master Write data Corrupt Master write data 
MRespAccept Master Master accepts response Mute Master accepts and suspend Slave 
SCmdAccept Slave Slave accepts transfer Mute Slave accepts and suspend Master 
SData Slave Read data Corrupt Slave read data 
SDataAccept Slave Slave accepts write data Mute Slave accepts and suspend Master 





CHAPTER 5  
HT IMPACT AND PROPOSED HT COUNTERMEASURE 
This section presents the HT impact and proposed countermeasure for HTs in NI. 
We implemented various HTs targeted for our NI based previous analysis and HT 
design methodology. The HT attacks to the data transmission within the NoC were 
either quantitatively or visually evaluated using real digital applications. Particularly, 
we showed the examples fingerprint identification, image and video transmission. 
Finally, we proposed a state obfuscation technique for HT countermeasure in the 
proposed NI. The efficiency of method was evaluated, as well. 
5.1 Hardware Trojan Implementation 
We show three case studies to illustrate the details of HT insertion in NI, either at 
netlist gate level or at RTL code level. The three cases are HT insertion at FSM 
control, routing table and FIFO memory, respectively. We make reasonable 
assumptions on the attacker’s objectives and explain in details how and where the HTs 
will be placed to conduct malicious behavior. The real implementation of various HT 
instances are also presented and compared in terms of area and power. 
5.1.1 Case Study 1: HT Insertion in FSM Control Logic 
As mentioned in Section 3, there are a great many FSM based control logic in a 
modular NI. Because of the FSM unit’s role in NI, we expect that the FSM control 
unit might be a critical target point of hardware attacks. We assume that the malicious 
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attacker has access to the synthesized netlist of the original design and can insert HTs 
at the netlist level. By using EDA tools, the attacker can find out the number of 
registers in the FSM design and examine the FSM function through a brute-force 
method. HTs can therefore be placed in the FSM control unit to cause NI malfunction 
and degrade NoC performance.  
     
(a)                                      (b) 
Figure 5-1 Single state HT insertion in FSM (a) conceptual view (b) RTL insertion 
For an N-bit FSM, there are    available states for the designer to construct the 
control logic. Typically not all the available states are utilized as legal states and the 
unused states create ideal places for HT insertion from attacker’s perspective. The HT 
inserted in unused state remains dormant when in normal operation and can perform 
attack by disabling certain output signals. For example, Figure 5-1 (a) shows a single 
// Single State HT Insertion 
... 
// FSM next state logic 
always@(*)begin 
case(curr_state) 
        Idle:... 




next_state = T0; 
end 







//FSM output logic 
always@(*)begin 
case(curr_state) 
        Idle:... 
        Write_Routing:... 
... 
//****HT Payload***** 








state HT inserted in the NI central FSM. The HT bypasses the state of writing control 
information into the header flit by disabling the write enable signal to asynchronous 
FIFO. This leads to header flit loss to a packet and when the receiving end receives 
this packet, it may not be recognized as a valid packet due to the lack of control 
information. Figure 5-1 (b) gives the RTL insertion of HT.  
    
(a)                                      (b) 
Figure 5-2 Multi-state HT insertion in FSM (a) conceptual view (b) RTL insertion 
The HT in FSM can also be multi-state insertion, as shown in Figure 5-2. This 
HT can skip several cycle of writing data flit to the FIFO before finally being reset to 
idle state. In a real application of NI, the loss of data flits of a packet can also lead to 
serious impact. For instance, in the video stream transmission between a master CPU 
// Multi-state HT Insertion 
... 
// FSM next state logic 
always@(*)begin 
case(curr_state) 
        Idle:... 
        Write_Routing: 
        Write_Control: 




next_state = T0; 
end 
T0:if(HT_trg2) next_state = T1; 
        T1:if(HT_trg3) next_state = T2; 






// FSM output logic 
always@(*)begin 
case(curr_state) 
        Idle:... 
        Write_Routing:... 
... 
//****HT Payload***** 








and a slave MPEG decoder, the image frames of the stream may be distorted or may 
not be recovered due to the data loss. More details are further presented in 5.2. 
Similarly, Figure 5-2 (b) provides the RTL code description. 
5.1.2 Case Study 2: HT Insertion in Routing Table 
The routing table stores the routing information for all the IP cores within a NoC. 
In our design, the routing table is based on a CAM plus RAM architecture. Before 
fetching the routing path from the RAM, the CAM searches its contents to find a 
match for a certain MAddr request. The output of CAM is in one-hot code, so it has to 
be encoded to a binary address before getting the routing path from RAM. The 
one-hot to binary converter is also a place where attack can easily place HTs. Since 
we target for a 4×4mesh NoC, a 16-bit one-hot to 4-bit binary encoder is necessary in 
our NI. Figure 5-3 (a) shows the gate-level implementation in our design. The 
Enc4to1 sub-block realizes the 4-bit one-hot to 2-bit binary conversion and a 
structural implementation of 4 Enc4to1 sub-blocks can realize the 16-bit to 4-bit 
conversion. Figure 5-3 (b) shows the RTL insertion of HT. If the binary read address 
to RAM is hacked, an incorrect routing path will be assigned to a certain packet, and 








Figure 5-3 HT insertion in the one-hot to binary encoder of routing table (a) gate-level 
implementation of one-hot binary encoder (b) HT insertion at RTL 
 
// HT at 16/4 One-hot Binary Encoder 
// 4-bit one-hot to 2-bit binary Encoder 





wire   sum;// sum is true if any input is true 
//*********HT Insertion****************** 
inputHT_trigger; 
assign bin[1]=(one_hot[3]| one_hot[2])^HT_trigger; 
assign bin[0]=(one_hot[3]| one_hot[1])^HT_trigger; 
//*************************************** 
assign sum =|one_hot; 
endmodule 
//factored 16-bit to 4-bit encoder 
module Enc16to4(one_hot, bin,HT_trigger); 
input[15:0] one_hot; 
output[3:0]  bin; 
wire[3:0] bin; 
wire[7:0]temp;// intermediate result of first stage 
wire[3:0] d;// if any set in group of four 






//four LSB encoders each include 4-bits of the input 
  Enc4to2 e0(one_hot[3:0],temp[1:0],d[0]); 
  Enc4to2 e1(one_hot[7:4],temp[3:2],d[1]); 
  Enc4to2 e2(one_hot[11:8],temp[5:4],d[2]); 
  Enc4to2 e3(one_hot[15:12],temp[7:6],d[3]); 
//MSB encoder takes summaries and gives MSB 










Figure 5-4 HT insertion in FIFO pointer (a) gate-level implementation of NI FIFO pointer (b) 
RTL insertion of HT 
The HT can also be placed in the FIFO memory itself, for example, the FIFO 
pointer and its related output signals. The FIFO read and write pointers are indicator 
of the memory availability and thus controlling the full and empty signals to the 
external. Figure 5-4 (a) presents the general view of binary and Gray code combined 
pointer used in our design. Binary counter is designed for pointer incrementing and 
addressing to the FIFO RAM. When the RAM is not full (empty), the binary write 
// Gray code read pointer generation 
module rptr_empty(...); 
... 
output rempty;// FIFO read empty 
parameter ADDRSIZE =4; 




//Insertion at Binary counter 
assign rbnext =(!rempty ? rbin + rinc : rbin)^HT_trigger; 
//Insertion at Gray code conversion 







(read) counter increments as the inc signal asserts. The Gray code counter is designed 
for fast pointer comparison to assert or de-assert the FIFO full and empty signals. 
Figure 5-4 (b) presents the HT attack to the write pointer at RTL. If the binary or Gray 
code counters are flipped when the HT trigger asserts, they will generate incorrect full 
or empty signals to external modules, or incorrect binary address to the internal RAM. 
Both cases will lead to FIFO overflow and data corruption. 
 
(a)                                   (b) 
Figure 5-5 HT attack in FIFOs with different depth (a) the probability causing overflow (b) 
the average number of corrupted data flit 
We justify that the HT attacks to FIFO pointer may possibly cause memory 
overflow or overwriting by giving incorrect availability information to the external. 
However, this situation only happens when writer pointer is changed to a certain 
address behind current address or read pointer is changed to an address ahead of 
current address. The results of HT attack may be slightly different over different FIFO 
depth due to its different addressing. If we assume the HT randomly flips the FIFO 
pointers, Figure 5-5 (a) shows the probability that memory overflow happens. The 
probability is slightly increasing but still in the range of 46% to 48.5%. Figure 5-5 (b) 
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shows the average number of corrupted flits if such attack happens. The number of 
corrupted flits is increasing almost linearly with the FIFO depth, meaning the impact 
of attack will become more serious in a larger FIFO. 
5.1.4 HT Hardware Overhead 
Table 5-1and 5-2give the implementation details of several practical HTs discuss 
previously. HT trigger circuits can be combinational, asynchronous counter based, 
hybrid and FSM based, which are shown in Table 5-1; HT payloads can be placed at 
global clock, routing table, FIFO pointer, FSM and header flit links, which are shown 
in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-1Implementation result summary of HT trigger circuits 
Trig. Type Circuit Structure Comb. Gate NO. of DFFs 
Comb. Trigger 1 XOR 1 0 
Async. Counter XOR+4-bit counter 14 4 
Hybrid XOR+2 4-bit counters 27 8 
FSM (a) 4-state FSM 7 2 
FSM (b) 4-state FSM 6 2 
FSM (c) 4-state FSM 8 2 
FSM (d) 4-state FSM 7 2 
 
Table 5-2 Implementation result summary of HT payload circuits 
Payload Location Comb. Gate Effect 
Payload1 global clock 1 Latching clock source 
Payload2 routing table 2 Causing incorrect routing path 
Payload3 FIFO pointer 4 Causing FIFO overflow 
Payload1 FSM logic NA Causing header/payload flit loss 




Figure 5-6 Comparison of different HTs in terms of area 
 
Figure 5-7 Comparison of different HTs in terms of power 
The synthesized results in IBM 0.18μm technology are also provided in Figure 
5-6 and Figure 5-7 in terms of area and power, respectively. HT instances present 
trivial overhead in all cases, less than 0.45% in area and less than 0.25% in power. 
Among them, combinational triggered HTs present minimum result, hybrid triggered 
HTs present maximum overhead. 
71 
 
5.2 HT Impact From Application Perspectives 
Though the HT insertion in NI may have various types of instances, the main 
effect of HT is to cause data or header flit loss through different ways. In this section, 
we provide two digital application examples visually evaluate the impact of flit loss 
caused by HTs. More specifically, we show the examples of the video stream 
transmission and fingerprint identification. 
5.2.1 Flit Loss in Image & Video Transmission 
Lost flits in the data transmission of NI will present significant impact to the 
image and video applications. Assuming that a NI is the bridge between a MPEG 
decoder and a graphical processor, we conduct experiments to simulate a series of 
image frames or video fragments are transmitting via the NI, which are shown as in 
Figure 5-8 (a) to (c). Each image is in a 326×260 RGB pixel format and finally 
converted to 63570 32-bit data flits when being transmitted. The lost or corrupted flits 
will distort or shift the images at display. Figure 5-9 shows the situation when only 
single data flit is lost. The distortion is noticeable in the first image frame, but the 
second image is still in great quality with negligible shifting. Figure 5-10 and 5-11 
presents the cases of six adjacent flits lost and six random flits lost, respectively. If the 
flits are adjacent, the first image are seriously distorted but the second image are only 
shifted with the information of next image frame, as shown in Figure 5-10; if the lost 
flits are randomly chosen, both of the images are distorted and shifted, which are 
shown as in Figure 5-11. In all the cases above, the last image frame cannot be 
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recovered since there is no enough flit data to recover a complete image frame. 
 
(a)                       (b)                      (c) 
Figure 5-8 A series of image frames for video stream 
 
                   (a)                                (b)     
Figure 5-9 Recovered image with single data flit loss 
 
(a)                                (b)     





                   (a)                                (b)     
Figure 5-11 Recovered image with multiple random data flits loss 
5.2.2 Flit Loss in Fingerprint Scanning & Identification 
Flit loss may also cause similar impact to identification or verification application. 
Assuming the NI is transmitting data from a fingerprint scanner to a central processor, 
the corrupted flits will make the identification more difficult. The original fingerprint 
is shown in Figure 5-12 (a). Similarly, the fingerprint image is first converted to a 
long sequence of binary data flits, and we simulate the case that image is corrupted 
during transmission by flipping the binary information. We explore the cases that the 
fingerprint image is corrupted with 0.1%, 0.5% and 1% data flits when transmitted, 
respectively. The recovered fingerprints at the receive end are shown in Figure 5-12 (b) 
to (d), correspondingly. The corrupted data are negligible in Figure 5-12 (b), become 
noticeable in Figure 5-12 (c) and continue to be more serious in Figure 5-12 (d). We 




(a)              (b) 
 
 
                   (c)(d)        
Figure 5-12 HT impact to fingerprint identification (a) original fingerprint (b)  fingerprint 
with 0.1% flit data corrupted (c) fingerprint with 0.5% flit data corrupted (d) fingerprint with 
1% flit data corrupted 
5.3 Proposed HT Countermeasure 
We discussed the HT insertion and HT impact to data transmission in previous 
sections of this chapter. In this section, we explored the countermeasure technique for 
HT detection at runtime. More specifically, we propose to exploit state obfuscation to 
facilitate hardware Trojan (HT) detection in the network interface (NI) of 
Network-on-Chips (NoCs). Secure memory access in NoCs has been studied in 
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previous work. Unfortunately, in addition to memory blocks, HT payloads might be 
inserted at other places in NoCs to cause NoC malfunctions and allow unauthorized 
accesses. In the first phase of our method, we add key bits to the finite state machine 
for the NI control unit and create dummy states to increase the difficulty for the HT 
attacker to perform meaningful attacks. In the second phase, we examine the illegal 
states and illegal state transitions induced by a wrong key to detect the occurrence of 
HTs. Similar concepts, e.g. logic encryption and obfuscation [50, 51], were mainly 
used for IP authentication, rather than HT detection. In [50], the obfuscation modes 
are decoupled from the normal operation modes and need be executed before the real 
function starts. In contrast, our method tightly integrates the obfuscation states with 
normal states. Moreover, we exploit the obfuscation states to detect HTs at runtime, 





Figure 5-13 Initiator NI with embedded HT detection 
5.3.1 Potential Security Threats to FSM 
As we discussed before, the FSM control unit in NI contains the main control 
logic of the transmitter. The FSM is synchronous to the OCP clock, and is responsible 
for reordering and writing the flits into transmit FIFO after packetization. Because of 
the FSM unit’s role in NI, we argue that the FSM control unit might be a critical target 
point of hardware attacks. In our method, we assume that HTs are placed in the FSM 
control unit to cause NI malfunction and degrade NoC performance. Our HT 
countermeasure method is thus embedded in the FSM control unit, as shown in dark 
shadow area in Figure 5-13. The details of state transition are presented again in 





Figure 5-14 FSM for Initiator NI 
5.3.2 Proposed State-Obfuscation HT Countermeasure and Detection Method 
 
Figure 5-15 New FSM diagram after using the proposed state-obfuscation method 
Our method is composed of two phases: (1) insert key bits to the FSM state 
transition conditions, and (2) detect illegal states and illegal state transitions. The key 
idea for the first phase is shown in Figure 5-15. One key bit is added to the condition 
of each state transition. Without knowing the key bits, the attacker cannot precisely 
control the effect of the HT insertion. If randomly modifying the FSM logic, the 
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attacker may lead the FSM turn into a default or illegal state. To confuse the attacker, 
we add obfuscation states in the FSM and connect each true state to a dummy state. If 
hardware cost is restricted, multiple true states can share one dummy state. Moreover, 
all the dummy states are connected, so that the FSM cannot jump back to a legal state 
after the FSM enters one of the illegal and dummy states. This arrangement facilitates 
to increase the HT detection rate. To further confuse the attacker, we can also put a 
key bit and a dummy transition condition between two dummy states. Examples of 
two detectable scenarios are shown in Figure 5-16.  
   
(a)                                 (b) 
Figure 5-16 Examples of detectable HT insertion cases in FSM (a) Single and (b) multiple 
illegal states and illegal state transitions 
The second phase is to examine whether two consecutive FSM states are defined 
in the FSM. To save the previous FSM state, we double the registers for the FSM 
states. The abnormal state transitions together with undefined FSM states are detected 
in the illegal state and illegal state transition detector unit, as shown in Figure 5-17. 
Dummy states introduced in the first phase are a portion of the illegal states. As the 
key sequence and the location of each key bit are unknown to the attacker, the effect 
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of HTs is likely to be one of our detectable illegal cases in the detector. 
 
Figure 5-17 Proposed HT detector that checks illegal states and illegal state transitions 
 
5.3.3 Simulation Results 
We applied the proposed state-obfuscation based HT detection method to the NIs. 
We implemented the NI a TSMC 65nm technology. Post-synthesize simulation was 
performed in Cadence NC-Verilog. To validate the efficiency of our method, we 
examined the HT detection rate for the situation that the HT payloads were placed in 
flip-flops and logic gates of the NI FSM control unit. For single- and double-HT 
insertion cases, we examined all possible cases. To save simulation time, we use 
Monte Carlo random simulation method to examine the impact of three, four and five 
HTs insertion on logic gates. 2,400,000 simulation cases were executed for each data 
point.  
 HT Detection Rate 
We believe that security check on NIs is vital to ensure the security and 
availability of the entire network and the system employing the NoC. The FSM 
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control unit is the most critical component in the NI, as the flit packetization and OCP 
protocol interpretation are mainly controlled by the FSM control unit. Malfunction on 
NI causes packet loss, unauthorized IP access and NoC performance degradation. In 
the following experiments, we examined our HT detection rate in the FSM control 
unit. Without a high HT detection rate, the risk of NI functionality being modified by 
malicious hackers is correspondingly high.  
In our NI FSM, we utilized five bits to represent different states. We assumed that 
the most effective way to hack the FSM is directly inverting the content stored in the 
FSM registers. Therefore, we examined the HT detection rate under the occurrence of 
one to five HTs in the FSM unit. As fifo_full, MCmd, MReqLast and to_transmit are 
the control signals (shown in Figure 5-14) to trigger the FSM transitions, we also 
varied those control signals in our experiments. We define the HT detection rate as the 
ratio of HT detected cases over the total evaluation cases. As shown in Figure 5-18, 
the proposed HT detection method achieves over 97.5% HT detection rate in various 
test cases. If the number of HT payloads increases to four and five, our method 
obtains 100% HT detection rate. The HT detection rates for one HT and two HTs are 
slightly lower than other cases; this is because Hamming distance between two FSM 
states is one. We expect that the HT detection rate can be further improved by 




Figure 5-18 HT detection rate for HT attacks in the FSM state registers 
 
 
Figure 5-19 HT detection rate for HT attacks in the FSM logic gates 
Certainly, HT payload can also be placed in any logic gates in the FSM control 
unit. In fact, it is easier to hide the HT insertion in logic gates than to hide in the FSM 
registers. However, the former one is less effective than the latter one. One of the 
reasons is, the effect of the HT payload in logic gate maybe diminish due to logical 




































































with a probability of over 98%. Generally, the HT detection rate for less HT payloads 
is higher than that for more HT payloads, as the overall effect of less HTs are more 
likely to be filtered by logic inherent masking effects.  
 Reduction on HT Attack Success Rate 
We define the HT attack success rate as the probability of a HT successfully 
changing the FSM from one legal state to another legal state. As we discussed in 
Section 3, the application of key and dummy states in the FSM increases the number 
of possible states and state transitions. Without knowing the key, the HT inserted is 
very likely to lead the FSM enter the illegal states or illegal state transition. By using 
the proposed method, we can reduce the attack success rate of HTs inserted by 




Figure 5-20 Impact of key knowledge on HT attack success rate 
 
Figure 5-21 Impact of different FSM states on HT successfully attacks 
As shown in Figure 5-20, without the correct key on the FSM state transition 
diagram, the probability of a HT successfully modifying the FSM state is 71.5% less 
than that of knowing the exact key value. We further examined the impact of different 
FSM states and control signals on the HT attack success rate. As shown in Figure 5-21, 
the most frequently used states (e.g. s0 and s3) are easier to be changed by HTs than 
other states. When the control signal associated with the particular state is asserted, 
the impact of HTs is more significant than the control signal is not enabled.  




























































The proposed method achieves a high HT detection rate and reduces the 
probability of a HT attack successfully modifying the FSM. As the critical path for NI 
w/wo our method is less than 1ns, we set the clock frequency of the NIs to 500MHz. 
As shown in Table 5-3, our method has 3.2% area overhead and consumes 1.7% more 
total power, compared to the baseline NI design.  
Table 5-3 Area and Power of the NIs w/wo Proposed Method 
Design for Comparison Area (µm
2
) Power (mW) 
Baseline NI (no key insertion and HT detection) 19133.2 (100%) 
6.491 
(100%) 







CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
Network-on-Chip (NoC) is emerging as a prevalent on-chip communication 
infrastructure. The flexibility and scalability of NoC make it feasible to migrate to the 
era of many heterogeneous IP cores on a single die. As the scale and complexity of a 
NoC system increase, the security of on-chip communication is expected to be 
another concern. Although the globalization of current IC industry helps to reduce 
design cost and shorten the time to market, it also makes the fabricated chips 
vulnerable to hardware tampering and Trojan insertion. In this thesis, a highly 
modular network interface is designed and implemented for OCP compatible NoC 
systems. The hardware security aspects of NI are analyzed and addressed. 
For the future work in this topic, the HT implementation in a system level 
emulation platform using FPGA or ASIC technology is highly expected. Also, more 
advanced and efficient HT countermeasure techniques need to be explored as well. 
The key contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.  
This thesis starts with basic introduction of NoC development, hardware security 
issues in IC chips. In Chapter 2, we review the basics of NoC design problems. Based 
on the design problems analyzed, we proposed our baseline NI design in Chapter 3. 
The proposed NI was implemented with an IBM 0.18μm CMOS technology and 
compared with exiting designs reported in literature. The synthesis results in terms of 
86 
 
power, timing and area reported. The hardware cost of our NI design is comparable 
performance with previous work. 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the network interface circuit at the system level and 
presented comprehensive and meaningful HT attack models from attackers’ 
perspectives. The impact of multiple practical HT triggers and payloads on NI 
performance and NoC applications are evaluated with simulations. Chapter 5 presents 
the detailed implementation results of HTs. The corresponding effect of HT insertion 
was also assessed with real digital application examples. Finally, a state obfuscation 
technique is proposed for HT countermeasure and detection. Our method obtains a 
relatively high detection rate of over 98% for all test cases and reduces the HT attack 
success rate by 71.5%, at the cost of 3.2% area increase and 1.7% more power 
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